Brazil’s AI Strategy

In June 2025, Brazil’s federal government published the finalized version of its Artificial Intelligence Plan (Plano Brasileiro de Inteligência Artificial or PBIA), one year after its initial launch. The plan pledges $4 billion across five pillars, including AI infrastructure and development; AI diffusion, education, and capacity-building; AI to improve public services; AI for industry innovation; and AI regulation and governance. At the time of publication, about 29% of the planned resources have been used, primarily spent towards the industry innovation pillar. Various agencies at the federal level are still debating their respective delivery responsibilities.

The implementation of the regulation pillar of the PBIA has lagged in particular over uncertainty around parallel efforts by Brazil’s Congress to advance an ambitious and comprehensive AI governance bill. The Brazil AI Bill (No. 2338/2023) passed Brazil’s Senate in December 2024 and is currently under discussion in the House of Representatives, where major amendments are expected. The Senate draft established different obligations across AI developers, distributors, and deployers, the structure and definitions of which are still being debated. The nature of pre-deployment assessments to identify the risk levels of AI systems is also a topic of ongoing discussion, be it for “excessive risk” and “high risk” use cases, or “general models with systemic risk”. All in all, Brazilian lawmakers are attempting to balance multiple goals, such as protecting fundamental rights, without stifling AI innovation. Beyond the federal level, some Brazilian states have also established their own AI initiatives and economic momentum. For instance, the state of Goiás has focused on building partnerships with companies like Nvidia.

Share

What Brazil Offers

Brazil has long pursued a diplomatic strategy of developing and wielding soft power. Brazil plays a regional leadership role in Latin America, especially on geopolitically relevant issues like climate change and food security. Brazil shapes the regional digital agenda through high-level cooperation with the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). Its efforts to date have promoted digital governance, inclusion, and sustainable development. Furthermore, Brazil actively supports Latin American cooperation with Europe on AI. It has co-hosted high-level dialogues under the EU-LAC Digital Alliance, such as the one held in São Paulo in 2025, which focused on advancing concrete joint initiatives in areas like High-Performance Computing (HPC) infrastructures, Large Language Models, and regulatory AI sandboxes.

Internationally, Brazil also actively advances Latin American perspectives and priorities in AI governance forums. In 2023, Brazil was invited to the Bletchley Park AI Safety Summit as the only representative from Latin America and signed the Bletchley Declaration. In 2024, the country hosted the G20 and, with UNESCO, launched the Toolkit for AI Readiness and Capacity Assessment. This toolkit aims to create an AI development assessment model based on inclusiveness, equality, and sustainability, seeking to bridge the North-South digital divide through collaborative governance. During its 2025 BRICS presidency, Brazil positioned AI governance as a priority, leading to the BRICS Leaders' Declaration on the Global Governance of Artificial Intelligence in June 2025. This declaration represents a joint position by Global South countries collectively representing over 40% of the world's population. In this context, Brazil could bolster the relevance of the BRICS forum at a time when many states are retreating from multilateral forums in favor of bilateral agreements.

Brazil’s world-leading biodiversity is leveraged as a strategic focus for AI development, especially as a key component of the country’s sustainable development during its G20 presidency. Through actions like the launch of the Prospera Sociobio program, which establishes socio-bioeconomy hubs, Brazil hopes to strengthen local production and incorporate new technology. Alongside the National AI Plan, if accompanied by robust regulatory frameworks that ensure ethical benefit-sharing, Brazil’s AI-driven sustainable development effort has the potential to serve as a global test bed. This potential is evidenced by climate-resilient solutions showcased during COP 30 in Belém (northern Brazil) in November 2025.

Finally, Brazil’s digital user base provides an advantage for AI diffusion, with Brazilians ranking among the top globally in daily time spent online. This deep digital integration is supported by an internet penetration rate of 86.2% (as of early 2025), exceeding that of China. Brazilians also use AI heavily, ranking in the top three globally for weekly ChatGPT usage (behind the US and India), while holding the second-highest (next to the US) number of active developers utilizing the OpenAI API. This digitally fluent consumer base provides a fruitful environment for rapid AI diffusion across the economy.

Subscribe now

What Brazil Wants from the World

In terms of hard assets to build AI, Brazil is still trying to find its footing. In September 2025, the government cut taxes on computing equipment to expand its data centre and other AI infrastructure, which is currently limited. To attract data centre construction, Brazil is leveraging its energy and land resources. Brazil expects to receive more than $11.3 billion in data centre investment over the next four years, which would more than double its current data center capacity. Still, infrastructure buildup and the business landscape face bureaucratic challenges that could slow potential deals. To address such challenges, Brazil may attempt to use its diplomatic power and position as a “swing state” in US-China competition to strike beneficial partnerships. Currently, Brazil has secured commitment from China’s TikTok to host its first Latin American data center by 2027, powered entirely with renewable energy.

Brazil’s push for AI development is fundamentally challenged by a critical AI skills shortage, despite rising demand from the corporate sector. Brazilian companies are aggressively prioritizing AI talent, with AI job postings quadrupling from 2021 in 2024. However, supply of talent does not meet demand – over 70% of Brazilian tech companies consider in-house AI talent as insufficient, with many bringing in skilled workers from India.

In terms of direct threats, Brazil’s AI ambitions are endangered by severe cybersecurity vulnerabilities. The nation is a major target of cyberattacks, facing more than 1,500 malware infection attempts every minute from 2024-2025. This poses a significant risk to the data security and technological autonomy necessary to scale AI infrastructure. While the government is actively attempting to mitigate this by establishing the National Cybersecurity Strategy (E-Ciber) and advancing a comprehensive new legal framework, the nation’s historical lack of unified federal legal frameworks and low technical capacity leave its critical infrastructure and sensitive data exposed.

US-China Alignment

Brazil has significantly deepened AI cooperation with China through multiple high-level agreements and joint initiatives. During President Lula’s 2025 state visit to China, the countries signed a memorandum of understanding on strengthening AI cooperation covering infrastructure development, training and exchanges, applications sharing, security risk mitigation, and professional skill development. As the 2025 BRICS president, Brazil has placed AI governance and digital inclusion at the forefront of the BRICS agenda, working closely with China to promote UN-led global AI governance that ensures “broad and inclusive international collaboration” for developing countries.

Despite this cooperation, the broader Brazil-China economic relationship is marked by growing dependency concerns. Brazil maintains a substantial trade surplus with China, but its exports are heavily concentrated in primary commodities like soybeans, iron ore, and oil, while it imports high-value manufactured goods and technology from China. Brazilian experts widely view this trade imbalance as fueling a process of de-industrialization and undermining national efforts to diversify the economy and build advanced manufacturing capacity. Furthermore, Brazilian academics have expressed concern that the country could become technologically dependent on Chinese firms, undermining its sovereignty and national security.

US engagement with Brazil on AI has previously occurred primarily through multilateral forums like the G20, and UN initiatives, rather than dedicated bilateral AI cooperation mechanisms. This contrasts with Brazil’s more structured AI partnerships with China. Brazil-US relations faced a major crisis after the Trump administration imposed high tariffs on Brazilian exports and sanctions on a member of the Supreme Court. The situation is stabilizing, although some uncertainties remain.

Brazil is highly sensitive to the risks of being caught in the middle of the US-China rivalry. On the defence side, the US government is wary of Chinese involvement in dual-use minerals and key ports like Rio Grande do Sul. Meanwhile, Brazil’s vast niobium reserves (90% of global production) – a heat-resistant mineral with defence applications including in hypersonic vehicles – are crucial to US and NATO defense. Brazil will continue to attempt to balance these relationships, likely facing US pressure to “de-risk” dual-use rare earth supply chains from connections to China in the near term.

Leave a comment

Note: This living set of country profiles is intended to be an accessible resource for policymakers, academics, and industry professionals, and all others seeking to understand the international relations of the technology transforming our virtual feeds and physical environments. It reflects the state of affairs at the time of writing (December 2025).

Authors: Sydney Reis*, Zilan Qian*, Karuna Nandkumar*, Kayla Blomquist⁺, Sam Hogg, Sumaya Nur Adan, Julia Pamilih, Jonas Balkus, Renan Araujo, Songruowen Ma, Tiffany Chan1

France’s AI Strategy

France’s National AI Strategy has been in force since 2018. Driven by the France 2030 investment plan to transform the French economy, the Strategy has resulted in more than EUR 2.5 billion (USD 2.8 billion) of AI-related investments to date, with the goal of making France an “AI Powerhouse”. France has continually positioned itself as a European and global leader in AI, aiming to assert French AI sovereignty and challenge the AI dominance of the US and China. This ambition reflects France’s enduring political tradition of Gaullism, which advocates for a unified, independent, and sovereign French nation. To the French government, the path to European and French sovereignty in the AI domain is one of strategic interdependence, investing in funding, computing power, access to data, and talent to counterbalance the current dominant positions of the US and China.

France’s desire to develop AI capabilities independent from the US or China is bolstered by dedicated plans to transform the country into a global hub for AI training and research and supporting French SMEs’ digital transformation by facilitating AI integration. The French AI start-up Mistral (valued at €11.7 billion / USD $13.8B) following its September 2025 Series C led by ASML) is central to France’s vision of AI sovereignty, with the French pinning the hopes of a European model on the tech giant’s rapid rise. France has also adopted the “Osez l’IA” (Dare AI) initiative in July 2025, to accelerate AI adoption across all domestic companies, particularly small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), to boost national competitiveness.

What France Offers

France is increasingly recognized as a key center for AI investment in Europe. As the top destination for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Europe for six consecutive years, France offers a stable and attractive macroeconomic environment with the world’s seventh-largest economy by nominal GDP. The French Government’s direct financial support – including the government’s Deeptech Plan and the Bpifrance public investment bank mobilizing billions of euros – has demonstrated public sector commitment to private AI company success. This sustained financial commitment has helped attract foreign investors and foster domestic growth. As of 2024, France housed 45 tech unicorns, 16 with AI-related value propositions. French AI startups raised €1.9 billion in 2024, with 30% of national venture capital dedicated to AI, leading the US (28%), UK (25%), and China (17%) by share of VC in AI.

France possesses an important edge in global AI development due to its abundant, decarbonized energy supply, which supports the highly compute-intensive nature of modern AI. With an electricity production that is over 95% low-carbon (primarily from its large nuclear fleet) and the top electricity exporter in the EU, France offers a reliable, low-carbon power source for training massive foundation models. By contrast, other key AI middle powers like Japan and the UK are net energy importers. Recognizing this advantage, the French government has dedicated an initial €10 billion investment toward constructing one of the world’s largest 1 Gigawatt (GW) decarbonized AI supercomputer sites. This infrastructure is designed to leverage France’s unique energy sovereignty, aiming to attract global AI companies seeking to minimize the significant operational costs and carbon footprint associated with large-scale deep learning and data center operations.

France boasts strong capabilities in fundamental mathematics, which is important for AI development. This is underpinned by top-rated universities (e.g., Paris-Saclay, Pierre and Marie Curie, and PSL University Paris) and the second-highest number globally of Fields Medal winners (the equivalent of the Nobel Prize for mathematics). This strength in the fundamental sciences translates to AI research, with France ranking the third in the world in number of AI researchers, cultivating leading experts like Turing award winner Yann LeCun. US AI companies OpenAI and Cohere have set up offices in France, citing the regional talent pool as one main driver.

Subscribe now

What France Wants from the World

Despite possessing a relatively strong innovation environment and research capabilities, France faces potential loss of its AI companies to the US. Many AI companies founded by French entrepreneurs established a stronger presence in the US, such as Hugging Face and Pathway. For French entrepreneurs, the aforementioned limited fundraising opportunities are the main reason for choosing the US, with other factors like regulatory environment and innovation culture mentioned as additional reasons.

Similarly, France faces a net loss of its competitive AI talent pool. A 2024 comparative study of five European countries (France, Germany, Ireland, the UK, Switzerland) and the US found that France is the only country among the six experiencing more emigration than immigration in AI talent. AI professionals may encounter obstacles such as higher US salaries and a better innovation culture that push local AI talent to emigrate. Systemic barriers related to language and education can prevent entry of foreign talent into the French ecosystem and discourage international partnerships, such as those that make it difficult for non-French speakers and individuals with degrees from outside the Grande Écoles system (a network of prestigious French higher education institutions) to work in France. The French government is attempting to address the talent loss by allocating EUR 100 million (USD 108 million) to attract foreign talent. Local universities have also designed targeted programs to appeal to scientists in the US who face current budget cuts.

US-China Alignment

President Macron has consistently articulated an ambition for France to achieve “strategic autonomy” in AI, explicitly positioning French capabilities as an alternative to US and Chinese dominance. France places significant emphasis on its energy edge as a path to become a third pole, aiming to build public supercomputers as an ‘alternative to the American cloud giants’. This vision of AI sovereignty, rooted in France’s Gaullist tradition of independence in foreign policy, drives France’s efforts to build indigenous AI capabilities, attract international investment on its own terms, and shape global AI governance frameworks that reflect European values and interests.

Despite this rhetoric of independence, France’s ambitions to shape the global AI governance agenda and pursue sovereign AI are constrained by geopolitical realities. Given the intensifying regulatory friction with the United States, which actively resisted the EU’s comprehensive AI Act, the AI Action Summit in Paris failed to achieve the expectation from global policymakers and experts of extending the “Brussels Effect.” The Summit also drew criticism from leading AI figures for failing to address AI risks and harms. Instead of pushing for global convergence with strict EU standards, France has demonstrated a pivot toward a pro-innovation, anti-regulatory stance, which is structurally closer to the US model. This stance, combined with overall framing and rhetoric around the AI Impact Summit, illustrates how France’s technological leadership ambitions are heavily shaped by economic pressures to prioritize domestic competitiveness over regulatory dominance.

Similarly, France still relies on the US and China to advance its AI agenda. France actively courts American investment and collaboration, successfully attracting funding from major US tech companies like Amazon, Microsoft, and NVIDIA for French AI infrastructure projects and startups. However, the relationship has notable friction points: the US declined to sign France’s AI declaration at the 2025 Paris AI Action Summit, and France lacks the formal bilateral AI partnerships that the US has established with closer allies like the UK and Japan. Meanwhile, France and China appear to find common ground in their AI value propositions. The May 2024 Macron-Xi joint statement on AI emphasized multilateralism, inclusivity, and balancing AI opportunities with risks – themes that align with France’s vision of an alternative governance model to perceived US unilateralism. The two countries reaffirmed their promise of bilateral cooperation on AI during Macron’s visit to China in December 2025.

French academics, however, have wondered how far the US will “allow” Paris’ relationship with Beijing to go. France remains normatively and formally embedded in NATO security architectures, bound by EU regulations – especially the China “derisking” agenda. This limits its deeper technological integration with China, particularly in AI-integrated advance manufacturing and AI-related infrastructure, as exemplified by previous frictions over Electric Vehicles and 5G. By cultivating ties with both powers while committing fully to neither, France aims to preserve strategic flexibility, assert European, and importantly, French interests, and position itself as an independent voice in global AI governance – even as the practical constraints of security, talent, and technology ecosystems pull it toward greater engagement with the US.

Leave a comment

Note: This living set of country profiles is intended to be an accessible resource for policymakers, academics, and industry professionals, and all others seeking to understand the international relations of the technology transforming our virtual feeds and physical environments. It reflects the state of affairs at the time of writing (December 2025).

Authors: Sydney Reis*, Zilan Qian*, Karuna Nandkumar*, Kayla Blomquist⁺, Sam Hogg, Sumaya Nur Adan, Julia Pamilih, Jonas Balkus, Renan Araujo, Songruowen Ma, Tiffany Chan1

Indonesia’s AI Strategy

As a large, middle-income country, Indonesia’s AI strategy sits within its wider ambitions of becoming a high-income country. Indonesia launched its first AI strategy (“Stranas KA”) in 2020 as part of the overarching national strategic roadmap “Golden Indonesia 2045”. In August 2025, the Ministry of Communication and Digital Affairs (Komdigi) followed this with a 196-page AI white paper (“Buku Putih Peta Jalan KA Nasional”) for public consultation.

The white paper identifies three pillars of AI: talent development, research & innovation and infrastructure & data. It also sets out a suite of recommendations, including the creation of a sovereign AI fund by 2029 under Danantara, Indonesia’s new $900bn Temasek-inspired sovereign wealth fund. While the roadmap represents policy progress, the proposals do not yet represent a coherent governance architecture.

Indonesia’s AI evolution will have to balance foreign investment, domestic politics and digital sovereignty. Current President Prabowo Subianto has highlighted AI adoption in agriculture and health, reflecting the strong focus on economic growth, and ministers repeat Indonesia’s hope for more foreign investment. At the same time, domestic politics create a challenging environment for foreign investors. Digital sovereignty is a key pillar of Indonesia’s approach to tech governance, underpinning strict requirements for data localisation laws and data storage. As one example, Indonesia temporarily suspended TikTok’s operating licence earlier this year for failing to hand over data relating to public security. Meanwhile, President Prabowo permitted the transfer of Indonesian personal data to US private entities in July 2025 as part of the Indonesia–US Reciprocal Trade Agreement. Indonesia’s AI trajectory is likely to be shaped by this ongoing tension between the desire to attract capital and the instinct to exert political and regulatory control.

What Indonesia Offers

Indonesia’s value proposition is an abundance of the raw ingredients needed to benefit from AI and its build-out. Scale is an obvious asset. Indonesia has over 280 million people, and its population is young and mobile-first. Indonesians are also unusually optimistic about AI, with a strong majority seeing AI services as more beneficial than harmful. However, education remains a major challenge: although the proportion of young people attending university has increased, education levels lag behind other ASEAN countries.

The second ingredient is a relatively strong technology ecosystem. Indonesia is home to the largest e-commerce market in ASEAN and 10 unicorn companies, anchored by superapp GoTo (Gojek-Tokopedia). The tech industry is a key driver of AI progress in Indonesia, spearheading initiatives endorsed by the government. Tokopedia supports an AI research center at the University of Indonesia, while GoTo has also contributed to the development of Sahabat-AI, an open-source 70-billion-parameter multilingual LLM (comparable in scale to Meta’s Llama 2). Sahabat-AI is built on Indosat’s GPU Merdeka, a “sovereign AI” GPU-as-a-Service platform based in Indonesia that provides access to Nvidia H100-class compute. Companies present these investments as “reinforcing Indonesia’s digital sovereignty” and aligning with government commitments.

Indonesia has little presence in frontier AI and no indigenous fabrication, but one strategic wedge is its access to raw materials. Indonesia recently banned the export of raw nickel, requiring companies to process the metal inside the country to strengthen the local processing industry. This successful movement up the value chain is seen as a template for further expansion of critical mineral production. The Indonesian government is considering further restrictions on access to materials including aluminum and tin. AI relies heavily on physical hardware and energy storage, both of which require critical minerals like nickel and tin to manufacture. By controlling access to these raw materials, Indonesia could effectively force global tech companies to build their hardware factories within its borders, securing a place in the physical AI supply chain.

Finally, Indonesia has substantial energy resources. Indonesia is one of the world’s largest coal exporters, a significant natural gas producer and has large but underdeveloped geothermal potential. These ingredients could help create a competitive environment for data centres. Indonesia currently has 81 operational facilities and 24 upcoming data centres under development or planning, demonstrating the country’s rapid digital infrastructure growth. Besides the capital Jakarta as the main data centre hub, Batam Island, 1 hour by ferry from Singapore, also offers good connections to subsea cables and abundant water for cooling. Oracle plans to open its first data centre in the area. Despite this, human resources, electricity pricing, regulation, and permitting remain barriers to data centre growth.

What Indonesia Wants from the World

Attracting foreign investment is a top priority for Indonesia’s economic and technological growth, but is often in tension with Indonesia’s model of state capitalism. Under the current administration, Indonesia created its Danantara sovereign wealth fund, intended to act as a conduit for foreign investment into strategic industries like AI and semiconductors. Indonesia has secured some high-profile wins, such as a US$2.3 billion investment by Dubai‑based EDGNEX for a large data centre campus in West Java, and new facilities by Microsoft, Google and AWS. Yet Indonesia’s challenging investment environment resulting from its governance model cuts against these ambitions. Although it has many of the raw ingredients to benefit from the global data centre buildout, development is slowed by friction from electricity pricing, fragmented governance, and shifting regulations. These governance challenges have slowed Indonesia’s aspiring data centre buildout compared to peers, as one example. As of the first half of 2025, there is 607MW in the pipeline, compared to 1.3GW in neighbouring Malaysia’s Johor.

A second priority is human capital investment. As outlined above, education is a key challenge in Indonesia and policymakers know that Indonesia needs help moving up the AI value chain. Komdigi has launched an AI Center of Excellence, supported by Nvidia, Indosat and Cisco that aims to advance Indonesian AI capabilities. Cisco has pledged to train 500,000 people by 2030, joining a variety of digital skills programmes, often in partnership with US and Japanese partners. The risk is that these programmes concentrate on entry‑level digital literacy and generic certifications rather than the deeper engineering, semiconductor and research capability needed to change Indonesia’s position in AI.

US-China Alignment

Indonesia’s commitment to non-alignment (bebas dan aktif) is a core principle of its foreign policy. The Indonesian government maintains a public stance of neutrality, and continues to cultivate ties with China, Russia and the US. On AI, this translates into a hedging strategy underpinned by economic interests. Indonesia seeks US and allied support for compute and cloud, but relies heavily on Chinese capital and technology for minerals, manufacturing and some infrastructure.

Over the past decade, ties with China have deepened, and investment from China has significantly increased. While President Trump’s desire to garner support from Indonesia for his Middle East plans has opened doors for further dealmaking, Chinese partners continue to dominate tech and infrastructure investment. The close relationship between Indonesia and Chinese tech giants is particularly significant: ByteDance’s 75% stake in Tokopedia is an investment designed to protect its e-commerce position in Indonesia, while also influencing how AI is adopted by Indonesians.

Indonesia continues to seek alignment with the US, including in military cooperation. Yet earlier this year the US withdrew from Indonesia’s flagship G20-facilitated $20bn JETP (Just Energy Transition Partnership) deal, undermining an initiative intended to build a key pillar of deeper US presence in Asia. There are reports that trade negotiations under the Trump administration have been hampered by strong US demands on Chinese investment in mining.

Indonesia’s regional influence is an important part of the picture. Indonesia has benefitted from strong financing relationships with Japanese and Korean partners. As a G20 member and ASEAN’s largest member, it has increasingly looked to multilateral fora to wield its influence. Indonesia became a full member of BRICS in January 2025 and has sought to join the OECD. The country is also looking to BRICS and other Global South forums to resist pressure against any further moves to force it to choose between the US and China, such as US export control regimes that seek to reduce Chinese‑linked investment.

Leave a comment

Note: This living set of country profiles is intended to be an accessible resource for policymakers, academics, and industry professionals, and all others seeking to understand the international relations of the technology transforming our virtual feeds and physical environments. It reflects the state of affairs at the time of writing (December 2025).

Authors: Sydney Reis*, Zilan Qian*, Karuna Nandkumar*, Kayla Blomquist⁺, Sam Hogg, Sumaya Nur Adan, Julia Pamilih, Jonas Balkus, Renan Araujo, Songruowen Ma, Tiffany Chan1

India’s AI Strategy

AI is central to India’s vision for national development, the framing of which is most evident in the “Viksit Bharat (developed India) by 2047” initiative. Viksit Bharat outlines India’s plan to become a global AI powerhouse by leveraging cutting-edge technology for economic growth, governance, and societal progress. The initiative builds on India’s 2018 “AI for All“ National Strategy, developed by the government’s policy think tank NITI Aayog, which identified AI as the “single largest tech revolution of our lifetimes”. AI for All reflects India’s broader national development goals through three main objectives: maximizing the economic impact of AI, using AI for social development and inclusive growth, and proposing India as the solution provider of choice for 40% of the world’s emerging and developing economies.

The India AI Mission, launched in 2023 and spearheaded by the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, further emphasizes these strategic goals. The mission focuses on developing applied AI to address societal challenges in healthcare, education, agriculture, and smart cities. Though India lacks a unified AI regulator or binding set of national laws to govern AI, its AI policies, especially the November 2025 non-binding India AI Governance Guidelines, intend to signal a commitment to rapid, inclusive, and ethical AI development across the country.

Share

What India Offers

India’s primary competitive advantages are strong human capital and rapid AI ecosystem development. According to the Stanford AI Index 2025, India ranks second (to the United States) globally in AI skill penetration, or the extent to which AI skills are present and used across fields. Notably, India’s AI skill penetration rate – the prevalence of AI skills being utilized by employees in their jobs across occupations – for women is the highest in the world. The country has also experienced the fastest AI talent growth globally, with a 252-263% increase in AI talent concentration since 2016.

To reduce dependencies on foreign technologies, India is attempting to build indigenous AI capabilities. The government has allocated 1.2 billion USD over five years to strengthen domestic AI capabilities, including developing a high-end common computing facility that could rival the current capacity of DeepSeek and ChatGPT. In terms of broader infrastructure, India is working to catch up, overtaking Japan, Singapore, and Hong Kong in 2024 to become a leader in Asia in data center investment. India’s startup ecosystem is also expanding, with Generative AI startup funding surging over the past year. In semiconductor design, India hosts approximately 20% of the global chip design workforce and launched the India Semiconductor Mission in 2021 to subsidise and support semiconductor ecosystem building across the country. India’s semiconductor market is projected to grow quickly, supported by strategic partnerships such as the 2024 India-Singapore Semiconductor MOU. To date, however, these infrastructure initiatives are investments; the outcomes for development of domestic capabilities remains to be seen.

Both government and industry in India have focused specifically on indigenous AI models and platforms, especially since the DeepSeek market shock in early 2025. The IndiaAI Mission has since identified and backed 12 companies to build sovereign models, with many offering optimization for India’s diverse linguistic and cultural environment. The government-backed BHASHINI platform, for example, provides AI-led language translation capabilities for over 22 Indian languages, while the startup Sarvam AI aims to build “sovereign” LLMs and AI agents for multilingual Indian contexts.

Share

What India Wants from the World

Despite public and private sector mobilisation towards AI capability development, India’s most pressing vulnerability is its dependence on imported advanced AI chips. While the government has invested heavily in the semiconductor industry, almost all chips are imported, creating supply chain vulnerabilities. Moreover, India faces a compute supply-demand mismatch: government acquisition of advanced AI chips has been insufficient to meet India’s AI development needs. Continued access to cutting-edge semiconductor technology and advanced manufacturing equipment is essential for India’s AI ambitions.

India still lacks a fully deployed indigenous large language model, although four government-backed startups are currently competing towards this goal. Lagging development of indigenous capabilities reflects broader infrastructure constraints and instability in India’s digital landscape. As one of the most water-stressed countries in the world, water supply remains one major obstacle for India’s ambition in data centers – infrastructures that require large, sustained amounts of water to support their cooling system.

To achieve its stated AI ambitions, India requires sustained investment in its AI ecosystem. Many partnerships focus on infrastructure and diffusion for specific use cases across society – for example, building up India’s public digital infrastructure and promoting AI adoption across the population. US tech giants like Meta, Google, and Microsoft invested heavily in various subsea cables, data centers, and cloud platforms. They also offer premium AI tools and provide AI upskilling programs for millions of Indians. Importantly, India requires diplomatic and economic frameworks that support its vision of becoming an AI hub for emerging markets while maintaining access to the global technology supply chain. As host of the 2026 AI Summit, India aims to build its profile as a distinctive AI power, focusing on themes that promote inclusivity and growth for the developing world; multilateralism, multilingualism, and multiculturalism; and democratisation of AI resources, which specifically refers to expanding global access to compute resources and data.

Subscribe now

US-China Alignment

Through strategic rhetoric and capability investments, India has positioned itself as an alternative partner to China in the global AI landscape, especially for developing countries. India has deepened technological and security ties with the US and its allies in light of tense India-China relations since the 2020 border clashes, while maintaining limited dialogue with China on certain economic and technological issues.

While India-US relations are on shakier ground due to the Trump Administration’s tariffs and restrictive visa policies, India’s collaboration with the United States on AI has increased in recent years, driven by shared systemic characteristics, security concerns about Chinese AI models, and complementary capabilities. High-level dialogues through frameworks like the Quad (US, India, Japan, and Australia) and the US-India Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET) produced initial AI collaboration, including joint research initiatives, technology transfer agreements, and coordinated approaches to AI governance. iCET, renamed to “Transforming the Relationship Utilizing Strategic Technology” (TRUST) in February 2025, now focuses primarily on accelerating US-origin AI built out in India and deeper collaboration in areas like critical minerals to “derisk” from China. Commercial interests are increasingly aligned with India’s strategic positioning, with major American and European technology companies viewing India as an attractive alternative to China-based operations – as evidenced by Apple’s planned shift to India for iPhone manufacturing and Bosch’s investment in AI and Internet of Things research and development in India. In July 2025, India and the UK formalized cooperation across advanced technology sectors including AI, semiconductors, and quantum through the UK-India Technology Security Initiative. However, rising tension over the Trump administration’s tariffs and demands for India to stop buying Russian oil have challenged deeper US-India cooperation.

Geopolitical tensions and past border disputes still overshadow India’s relationship with China on AI, leading to more constrained engagement. While high-level meetings, resumption of direct flights, and joint engagement in multilateral forums like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) have recently thawed India-China relations, substantive bilateral AI collaboration remains virtually nonexistent. Chinese commentators have expressed frustration with India’s approach to regional cooperation, with analysts like Liu Zongyi characterising India’s role in forums like the SCO as “disruptive” to Chinese strategic objectives. India’s AI positioning ultimately reflects an attempt to maintain flexibility to achieve its capability development and sovereignty goals, complicated by existing technical dependencies and the increased securitisation of the geopolitics of AI.

Leave a comment

Note: This living set of country profiles is intended to be an accessible resource for policymakers, academics, and industry professionals, and all others seeking to understand the international relations of the technology transforming our virtual feeds and physical environments. It reflects the state of affairs at the time of writing (December 2025).

Authors: Sydney Reis*, Zilan Qian*, Karuna Nandkumar*, Kayla Blomquist⁺, Sam Hogg, Sumaya Nur Adan, Julia Pamilih, Jonas Balkus, Renan Araujo, Songruowen Ma, Tiffany Chan1

South Korea’s AI Strategy

The core engine driving South Korea’s ambitious push to become a top-tier global AI power is its unique political and industrial structure, anchored by Chaebol conglomerates: massive, family-controlled industrial companies (like Samsung, SK, and LG) which account for over 40% of the national GDP. This model enables vertically integrated AI deployment: Samsung unites memory, foundry, and system design to build high-performance AI chips; and SK Group links telecoms, semiconductors, and energy to promote its AI data center project. The South Korean government has pushed these firms to invest heavily in technology development while shielding them from competition, creating a structural reliance on a few major players to achieve national strategic goals.

Leveraging the concentrated resources and industrial capability of the Chaebol conglomerates, South Korea employs a centralized state-directed national strategy and mobilization. Through the Korean Digital New Deal (2020) and the establishment of the National AI Strategy Committee, the government aims to coordinate policies across all ministries to overcome domestic regulatory fragmentation. South Korea’s political turmoil in 2024 and the power transition following President Lee Jae-myung’s inauguration in June 2025 motivated this centralized AI approach. In September, President Lee launched the National AI Strategy Committee to directly mobilise the national AI effort. Recent initiatives – such as a sovereign AI project with five technology firms aiming to attain 95% of the performance of leading models like ChatGPT – underscore a desire to leverage existing industrial concentration to advance national priorities.

South Korea’s governance and legal frameworks balance aggressive industrial promotion with regulatory guardrails. The AI Basic Act (effective Jan 2026) mandates transparency and safety for high-impact systems. However, compared to the EU AI Act, it simply encourages rather than requires AI risk assessments. South Korea’s Act also focuses on immediate concerns faced by the population, reflecting a more industry-friendly and pro-innovation stance. To enable innovation while safeguarding privacy, the government has implemented significant reforms to the Personal Information Protection Act (PIPA), clarifying the rules around using pseudonymized data for AI training and establishing data subjects’ rights to object to or seek explanations for fully automated decisions.

Subscribe now

What South Korea Offers

South Korea’s greatest strategic advantage in the AI revolution is its dominance in High Bandwidth Memory (HBM) – the specialized, high-performance memory essential for advanced AI chips (GPUs). As of 2025, Chaebol conglomerates SK Hynix and Samsung controlled around 90% of the world’s HBM share, making the nation a critical node in the global AI supply chain.

South Korea is aggressively transforming itself into a hub for AI computing and data storage in the Asia-Pacific region. The ambition is partly reflected by the government’s initiatives, including a planned $11.56 billion investment over five years in AI infrastructure, as well as the “world’s largest” data center by 2028. Partnerships with US tech giants also help the country increase its infrastructure advantages. In October 2025, South Korea announced a $5 trillion deal with NVIDIA to secure 260,000 of the most advanced GPUs and build a national AI-driven communication network. Amazon Web Services, who has already partnered with SK Hynix to construct cloud computing infrastructure, also recently pledged investment in AI data centers by 2031. Coupled with South Korea’s advanced digital infrastructure (for example, widespread 5G and submarine cables), these AI infrastructure initiatives will likely fast-track the nation’s lead in AI hardware.

With the world’s lowest birth rate and a contracting working-age population, South Korea has become a global leader in industrial robotics deployment. The nation’s high automation rate is quantified by its robot density – approximately 1,012 industrial robots per 10,000 employees in 2024, more than twice that of China, and three times that of the US. This widespread integration is particularly pronounced in the electronics and automotive sectors, where Chaebol conglomerates like Samsung, Hyundai, and Korean Air have partnered with US frontier companies. South Korea’s focus on automation serves as a systematic approach to maintain industrial productivity and address labor shortages across key sectors, a prime concern shared by many countries around the world facing demographic challenges.

Share

What South Korea Wants from the World

South Korea’s AI aspirations face constraints from the lack of national energy infrastructure. Existing grid capacity domestically may fall short of the immense power demands of advanced AI computing. Current energy sources also rely primarily on fossil fuels (60%) and nuclear energy (30%), with only 10% made up by renewable sources in 2024 (compared to a global average of 32%). Recognizing this vulnerability, the Lee Administration has prioritized the creation of a massive “Energy Expressway,” a long-term plan to establish a nationwide high-capacity power grid with a renewable energy focus by the 2040s. At COP30, the government also announced a significant reduction of greenhouse emissions by 2035. The commitment to increasing and “greening” the energy supply will be essential for the pace and competitiveness of South Korea’s AI ambitions.

Driven by structural issues in its research ecosystem, South Korea also faces a worsening brain drain of highly skilled professionals and researchers, especially in AI. In 2024, the nation recorded a significant net loss of 0.36 AI experts per 10,000 people, placing it near the bottom of OECD countries. The loss of young researchers is the main concern, with the government identifying a worrying trend of new PhD graduates seeking jobs abroad. This exodus is fueled by systemic weakness within academic and research institutions, which struggle with stagnant funding for cutting-edge projects and uncompetitive salaries for professors and top scientists. The countries’ rigid, seniority-based recruitment and pay structures also contribute to the problem. Leading scientific talent is actively departing Korean universities for institutions in the US and Europe, which provide superior research environments, state-of-the-art equipment, and significantly higher compensation, thereby threatening the long-term foundation of South Korea’s technological competitiveness.

Finally, South Korea’s fragmented and complex domestic governance system generates pervasive regulatory uncertainty. This issue stems from overlapping jurisdictions where multiple powerful agencies – such as the Korea Fair Trade Commission, the Korea Communications Commission, and the Ministry of Science and ICT – all assert authority over digital platforms and AI applications. This multi-layered environment compels tech companies to navigate numerous and often conflicting regulations, which dramatically raises compliance costs and exposes firms to the potential for unexpected interventions from competing government bodies. This tension has a chilling effect on innovation within the AI sector.

Share

US-China Alignment

As a central node in the US-led alliance system in Northeast Asia and advanced semiconductor supply chains, South Korea’s AI development aligns closely with American technology ecosystems and security frameworks. This alignment is exemplified by the landmark AWS-SK Group collaboration on data centers, NVIDIA’s AI chip deal, and OpenAI’s economic blueprint project. The Chaebol conglomerates also heavily invest in US AI development, with Hyundai Motor Group pledging a $6 billion U.S. investment from 2025-2028 on emerging technologies including AI, SK Group funding AI company Gauss Labs in Silicon Valley, and LG establishing its AI research center at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

While China represents South Korea’s largest trading partner with substantial economic leverage, its AI collaboration with China remains limited to commercial engagement rather than strategic partnership. South Korea’s absence of significant bilateral AI agreements or joint research initiatives with China contrasts with the depth of US-Korea AI cooperation. As the US experiments with limits on advanced semiconductor trade, South Korea faces growing pressure to align its AI ecosystem explicitly with American strategic objectives, even when this conflicts with existing economic ties to China. This asymmetric approach – integration with US AI capabilities paired with commercial engagement and competition with China – reflects South Korea’s broader strategic dilemma of balancing military alliance commitments with economic pragmatism in an increasingly polarized technological landscape.

Leave a comment

Note: This living set of country profiles is intended to be an accessible resource for policymakers, academics, and industry professionals, and all others seeking to understand the international relations of the technology transforming our virtual feeds and physical environments. It reflects the state of affairs at the time of writing (December 2025).

Authors: Sydney Reis*, Zilan Qian*, Karuna Nandkumar*, Kayla Blomquist⁺, Sam Hogg, Sumaya Nur Adan, Julia Pamilih, Jonas Balkus, Renan Araujo, Songruowen Ma, Tiffany Chan1

The UAE’s AI Strategy

When it comes to AI, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is sparing no expense. The federation has already poured USD $148B into AI development since 2024 and plans to aggressively integrate AI into its federal governance processes. In 2017, the UAE launched its Strategy for Artificial Intelligence 2031, becoming the first country to appoint a Minister of Artificial Intelligence in the process. The strategy maps the UAE’s goal of becoming a “global leader” in AI by 2031 through eight objectives, including building the UAE’s reputation as an AI destination, increasing competitive assets in priority sectors within the AI development chain, and developing its AI ecosystem. The UAE’s overall AI market has already grown substantially, projected to reach $46.33 billion by 2030, from just $3.47 billion in 2023-2024.

Abu Dhabi, one of the seven emirates of the UAE, is the core of the federation’s AI ambitions. In January 2025, the Abu Dhabi Executive Council approved the Government Digital Strategy 2025-2027, committing AED 13 billion (USD $3.54 billion) and an ambition to become the world’s first fully AI-powered government by 2027. The document claims that the emirate can achieve “100% AI integration” across all Abu Dhabi government digital services, the “complete automation” of government processes, and the adoption of sovereign cloud computing.

The UAE has shortened its federal strategic planning cycle from five years to three years, as one of several moves towards a more agile governance model. It also plans to mainstream AI-powered predictive modeling and performance metrics throughout the federal government. In September 2024, the UAE launched an “AI Principles and Ethics” framework with eight guiding principles: fairness, accountability, transparency, explainability, resilience, safety, human values, and sustainability.

Share

What the UAE Offers

The UAE’s competitive advantages lie in exceptional financial resources, strategic infrastructure investments, and institutional innovation.

Total Emirati AI investment reaches many tens to possibly low hundreds of billions of dollars, though precise figures are not publicly disclosed. In March 2024, Abu Dhabi’s sovereign wealth fund Mubadala, G42, and the UAE state-backed Artificial Intelligence and Advanced Technology Council announced the creation of MGX, an AI investment vehicle expected to reach $100 billion in assets. In September 2024, MGX, together with BlackRock, Global Infrastructure Partners, and Microsoft, launched a global AI infrastructure fund. In early 2025, MGX became one of four initial equity funders for OpenAI’s Stargate Project, which plans to invest $500 billion in US AI infrastructure over four years. Most recently, MGX participated in a $6.6 billion secondary share sale in OpenAI, marking one of the largest private transactions in the AI sector this year. Meanwhile, ATIC Third International Investment Co., an enterprise aligned with Mubadala, holds a sizeable ownership stake in Anthropic. Mubadala also owns GlobalFoundries, the third-largest semiconductor foundry by revenue in 2023, which sees increasing demand for its products to support embodied AI. These ownerships can translate into access to outsized financial returns from economically transformative AI, as well as potential influence over impactful strategic and governance decisions.

Infrastructure is another edge, backed by the UAE’s data center investment and energy advantages. The UAE has invested strategically in data center capacity, with upcoming capacity projected to exceed 1.4 GW, representing more than 3x growth and a significant regional share. More than $10 billion in new investments is expected to flow into the UAE’s data center sector by 2027. Abu Dhabi dominates the upcoming data center market, accounting for nearly 45% of planned capacity. The UAE data center market is projected to grow at a Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 17.64% from 2024 to 2030, reaching $3.33 billion by 2030. Furthermore, the UAE possesses energy advantages for AI infrastructure. The Barakah nuclear power plant was completed faster than comparable US projects. According to industry projections, the UAE’s total power capacity is expected to reach 79.1 gigawatts by 2035, with current capacity already providing substantial energy resources for AI operations. The country has simultaneously invested in renewable energy infrastructure, including Abu Dhabi-based clean energy company Masdar’s unprecedented facility.

The UAE’s offerings extend beyond investment and infrastructure to building regional soft power through advanced, open-source AI models, aiming to fill a critical linguistic and technological gap in the Middle East. The UAE-developed large language model, Falcon, is noteworthy for its technical characteristics and geopolitical utility in the Arab world. Offered under an open-source license, Falcon allows regional developers and governments to access and adapt the underlying AI technology without dependence on US or Chinese corporations. More importantly, Falcon’s specialized Arabic version addresses the significant linguistic deficit in existing frontier models, which are predominantly trained on English or Chinese data. The UAE has also committed itself to various South-South AI capacity building partnerships, including by investing in a green data-centre in Kenya and partnering with Malaysia and Rwanda to accelerate the responsible adoption of emerging technologies. However, the UAE still has a long way to go if it aspires to outspend China in aid diplomacy and technology capacity-building efforts.

Subscribe now

What the UAE Wants from the World

Despite these resources, the UAE faces dependencies that shape its international engagement priorities. The UAE requires continued access to cutting-edge AI chips, particularly NVIDIA’s advanced GPUs. US export controls on high-end chips remain a contentious issue. In 2024, the US House Select Committee on Strategic Competition investigated G42’s potential ties to China and proposed adding G42, a leading AI firm backed by the UAE government, and 13 connected companies, to the US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) entity list. Under the US Biden Administration’s Framework for AI Diffusion, the UAE would have faced restrictive access to high-end US chips; these restrictions have since been removed, but direct chip access remains uncertain. In July 2025, Trump administration officials reportedly stalled efforts to finalize a chip deal with the UAE.

The UAE’s pursuit of significant investment to fuel domestic AI adoption is evidenced by its approach to strategic international partnerships. Official plans explicitly outline its desire to transition from a hydrocarbon economy, with AI contributing up to 20% of non-oil GDP by 2031. To realize this goal, the UAE leans on partnerships with global technology giants to drive the development and the deployment of AI. Microsoft’s $1.5 billion investment in G42 came with assurances to both US and UAE governments on secure and responsible AI development. However, this partnership required G42 to divest from Chinese technology investments and reduce its China presence. The UAE continues to court technology partnerships with American firms, including OpenAI, Oracle, NVIDIA, and Amazon Web Services, while navigating US national security concerns.

The UAE’s rapid ascent in AI is fundamentally dependent on imported talent, built upon the government’s proactive approaches including low taxes, long-term “golden visas“, and lighter regulation. This reliance is visible at the Mohamed bin Zayed University of Artificial Intelligence (MBZUAI), the world’s first graduate-level AI research university. MBZUAI relies heavily on international faculty to staff its research programs, with faculty members who include a significant cohort of Chinese researchers.

Share

US-China Alignment

The UAE has made a clear strategic pivot toward alignment with the United States on AI development while maintaining limited economic engagement with China. This positioning reflects calculated assessments of technological dependencies, security partnerships, and long-term strategic interests. Microsoft’s $1.5 billion investment in G42, OpenAI’s partnership, and MGX’s participation in the Stargate Project demonstrate deep integration with US AI ecosystems. The government-led US-UAE AI Acceleration Partnership includes the US facilitating a 1GW AI data center in the UAE and reciprocal inward investments into the US by UAE Investment Funds.

However, as evidenced by the G42 chip access challenges, the UAE must demonstrate commitment to US technology standards and governance frameworks to maintain access to the latest AI capabilities. The UAE has significantly reduced AI-related engagement with China following US pressure. G42’s divestment from ByteDance and JD.com, along with broader reductions in Chinese technology partnerships across Emirati AI companies, is intended to signal prioritization of US relationships over Chinese access.

In non-AI sectors, the UAE’s economic ties to China remain significant. The UAE is China’s largest business incubator and trade partner, and a key node of the Belt and Road initiative. These commercial ties are renewed and strengthened through platforms like the Shanghai Forum, which aims to deepen the UAE-China investment fund to support Chinese enterprise expansion in the Middle East. Reciprocally, China is the UAE’s top non-oil trading partner and source of surveillance technologies.

The UAE’s approach to the new era of AI diplomacy reflects attempted management of great power competition, maximizing US technology access while preserving economic flexibility in areas less critical to national AI strategy. This is among the reasons why many US institutions still regard the UAE as a “swing state” in US-China relations – and a player that could one day rival the US’s AI dominance. Time will tell whether the UAE’s capital-driven ascendancy will deliver on predicted returns. But in the AI arena, the UAE is already far from a dependent client.

Leave a comment

Note: This living set of country profiles is intended to be an accessible resource for policymakers, academics, and industry professionals, and all others seeking to understand the international relations of the technology transforming our virtual feeds and physical environments. It reflects the state of affairs at the time of writing (December 2025).

Authors: Sydney Reis*, Zilan Qian*, Karuna Nandkumar*, Kayla Blomquist⁺, Sam Hogg, Sumaya Nur Adan, Julia Pamilih, Jonas Balkus, Renan Araujo, Songruowen Ma, Tiffany Chan1

Japan’s AI Strategy

With its societal affinity for fictional characters and robots, an acute labor shortage, and a high-compliance business environment driven by a risk-averse culture, Japan has clearly stated its ambition to become “the most AI-friendly country in the world”. This ambitious goal is made urgent by the looming “2025 Digital Cliff” – a national crossroads at which failure to modernize outdated legacy IT systems could lead to massive economic losses across Japanese society. Consequently, the Japanese government plans to achieve its AI ambition through an agile, light-touch governance approach that utilizes existing legal frameworks, viewing AI adoption as the necessary tool for national digital transformation.

Against this backdrop, the AI Promotion Act passed in May 2025 establishes Japan’s first formal yet non-binding AI legislative framework. The Act coordinates AI policy under five fundamental principles: alignment with existing national frameworks, promotion of AI as foundational technology, comprehensive advancement across all development stages, transparency in AI development and use, and international leadership in AI norm formulation. This strategy, overseen by a Cabinet-level AI Strategy Headquarters chaired by the Prime Minister, aims to ensure a whole-of-government approach and overcome the historical tendency for policy silos among government ministries. Rejecting the EU’s more rigid model, Japan seeks to be a “trusted nexus” for fragmented AI governance approaches worldwide through a pluralistic and interoperable approach. However, Japan has not fully overcome intra-ministry fragmentation on AI governance and regulation. The government has tasked its Digital Agency with facilitating AI adoption and coordination across ministries, especially for fundamental tasks like updating legacy government IT systems that make the country’s AI goals as steep as a cliff.

Japan’s financial commitment matches its regulatory ambition: the government has allocated ¥10 trillion ($65 billion) for semiconductor and AI development through 2030, with ¥2 trillion ($12.8 billion) approved in late 2024 specifically for AI and semiconductor industry strengthening. For fiscal year 2025 alone, Japan allocated approximately ¥196.9 billion ($1.3 billion) for AI-related activities, compared to Germany’s $1.8 billion in 2025 and South Korea’s proposed $7 billion for 2026.

Subscribe now

What Japan Offers

Japan plays an indispensable role in the AI supply chain, both in terms of raw materials and industrial products. While not a leader in foundational models, Japan controls one “chokepoint” within the semiconductor supply chain, dominating global supply of essential materials like silicon wafers (Shin-Etsu) and photoresists (JSR), as well as the advanced manufacturing and testing equipment (Tokyo Electron, Advantest) upon which all leading-edge fabs rely. The government is amplifying this advantage by heavily subsidizing TSMC’s new fabs and funding Rapidus, a national consortium aiming to mass-produce next-generation 2nm chips. The semiconductor section is further backed up by the government’s commitment of ¥10 trillion ($65 billion) investment by 2030.

Digital connectivity is a core strategic asset for Japan, positioning the country as the trusted data hub of the Indo-Pacific. Japan has 20 international cable landing stations providing high-capacity links, notably the 350 TBPS JUNO cable connecting to the US. This technical strength is amplified by industrial dominance, as Japanese firm NEC controls over 40% of Southeast Asia’s cable manufacturing market. This entire network is leveraged as a geopolitical tool: Japan seeks to build secure networks to counter China’s digital influence, ensuring that critical data pathways for allied AI development flow through secure, non-Chinese routes.

Another distinctive edge Japan possesses is in the development and deployment of specific AI applications, primarily driven by its unique demographic challenges and industrial legacy. The pressing need to replace a declining workforce and address labor shortages has accelerated the development and diffusion of Embodied AI (robotics) across various industries. This focus builds upon Japan’s advanced manufacturing legacy, where the integration of AI is most pronounced: companies like Toyota utilize AI platforms in precision manufacturing (e.g., using Google Cloud) to empower factory workers to deploy machine learning models for quality inspection. Simultaneously, as a country with a rapidly aging population, Japan is pioneering critical AI solutions in healthcare and elder care, evidenced by the deployment of specialized AI-powered robotics (like elderly care robots) and the use of integrated AI by firms such as Astellas Pharma to dramatically accelerate drug discovery and testing times.

Share

What Japan Wants from the World

Low technology adoption is a long-standing issue in Japan, largely driven by risk-averse institutional and cultural tendencies. In 2018, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) warned Japan about the aforementioned “digital cliff” of potentially massive economic losses of up to ¥12 trillion (approximately $77 billion) annually starting in 2025 from failures to adopt digitization. This is reflected in AI adoption, with the 2025 Information and Communications White Paper showing Japan’s AI usage at just 26.7%, far behind the US (68.8%) and China (81.2%). The Linux Foundation’s 2025 report indicates that the challenge of an unskilled workforce and low technology adoption is particularly severe in AI, where less than 40% of organizations possess common AI skills. These dynamics produce uneven progress across ministries, sectors, and regions, with leading central agencies and large firms in metropolitan prefectures moving ahead much faster on AI adoption than many local governments and small and medium-sized enterprises. Similarly, risk-averse culture is salient in Japanese society, with stigma around failure impeding many from innovating. To avoid this cliff and overcome cultural impediments, the government has sought global partnerships to encourage innovation, ambition, and foreign support for technical adoption. By engaging with foreign approaches, the Japanese government hopes to introduce more risk-taking thinking into its cultural apparatus. Examples include the J-startup program that selects innovative local startups for global expansion support, and a partnership with OpenAI to promote the adoption of advanced AI systems in government.

Japan also faces a related AI talent shortage due to prolonged economic stagnation and higher education structure. This gap is quantified in a 2019 METI “Survey on IT Human Resource Supply and Demand,” which projected a high-end shortage of 790,000 IT personnel by 2030. In 2021, Nikkei’s report further specified that 90% of the IT personnel in Japan were concentrated in website and app development, while the nation could see a shortfall of 270,000 specialists in AI and Internet of Things in 2030. In 2024, Japan had a 70% staff shortage in key areas such as cloud computing (compared to 47% in other global regions). Japan’s burst of the 1990s economic bubble and the subsequent “Lost Decade” resulted in major electronics and semiconductor companies implementing downsizing, early retirement, and cuts to R&D. This directly impacted tech talent cultivation and retention. Simultaneously, the lack of job security in higher education fields also discourages researchers from investing in long-term fundamental research. To address this weakness, the government has welcomed Microsoft’s $2.9 billion investment to provide the necessary cloud infrastructure and, most importantly, train three million people in AI skills. Simultaneously, Japan is attempting to recruit foreign AI researchers, particularly those experiencing difficulties with their work due to cuts in US funding, through initiatives like the $693 million plan to attract overseas AI and semiconductor research talent.

Subscribe now

US-China Alignment

Japan’s technological tilt is tied firmly to the US-Japan alliance, a relationship that has served as the cornerstone of East Asian security since the 1950s and is structurally reinforced by the enduring US military presence in the country. Consequently, the Japanese government views this strategic commitment as the primary pathway for securing its advanced technological future against geopolitical risks, even while its economic vulnerability necessitates measured engagement with China.

The US-Japan alignment was dramatically reinforced in late 2025 by the signing of the U.S.-Japan Technology Prosperity Deal (TPD) and a new defense cooperation framework. The TPD is designed to accelerate a “U.S. and Japan-led AI technology ecosystem”, deepening cooperation on advanced technologies and committing Japan to substantial investments, including up to $30 billion in US AI infrastructure. This partnership also integrates with broader multilateral efforts, such as the Chip 4 Alliance (US, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan), aimed at securing supply chains, protecting IP, and coordinating export controls on advanced semiconductors to counter Chinese influence.

However, this military-technological alignment with the US is constrained by economic vulnerability, which necessitates a pragmatic dual-track approach to Beijing. As one of Japan’s most important trade partners, China is critical as both a market and a supplier. Meanwhile, Japan is directly affected by the US-China rivalry through disputes over semiconductors and rare earth export controls. To mitigate these economic threats, Japan pursues dual-track diplomacy, engaging in pragmatic, high-level talks with Beijing – for example, on stabilizing trade flows and seafood imports – while strengthening its influence in ASEAN nations to diversify supply chains and engaging with its allies in the West on standard-setting around AI safety. However, Prime Minister Takaichi’s recent statement on a potential Taiwan contingency triggered strong diplomatic blowback from Beijing, resulting in economic countermeasures and a slump in tourism from China and retail stocks. This immediate economic fallout underscores the fragility of Japan-China ties and introduces uncertainty into Japan’s ability to balance its technological alignment in the longer term.

Leave a comment

Note: This living set of country profiles is intended to be an accessible resource for policymakers, academics, and industry professionals, and all others seeking to understand the international relations of the technology transforming our virtual feeds and physical environments. It reflects the state of affairs at the time of writing (December 2025).

Authors: Sydney Reis*, Zilan Qian*, Karuna Nandkumar*, Kayla Blomquist⁺, Sam Hogg, Sumaya Nur Adan, Julia Pamilih, Jonas Balkus, Renan Araujo, Songruowen Ma, Tiffany Chan1

The UK’s AI Strategy

Prime Minister Keir Starmer frames AI as “a chance to turbo‑charge growth and radically improve public services,” pledging to make Britain “an AI maker, not just an AI taker.” The AI Opportunities Action  Plan (AOAP, Jan 2025) set out that intent in three pillars.

The first pillar – AI Foundations – aims to secure the “foundations” of world‑class computing, data, talent and regulation. Specific goals include a twenty‑fold expansion of publicly controlled AI compute by 2030 and deployment of more than 5,000 advanced NVIDIA chips in the new super computer “Isambard‑AI”. The second pillar - AI Adoption - intends to spur rapid AI diffusion throughout the UK economy. Examples of AI adoption range from revamped National Health Service (NHS) diagnostic workflows to a Cabinet‑Office productivity suite. The third pillar – the UK as an AI Maker – argues that the UK government must take a more activist approach to cultivate its own national champions – companies with frontier capabilities across critical layers of the AI stack. To this end, the plan saw the creation of a Sovereign AI Unit (SAIU) with £500 million in potential funding, but outcomes for the independence of the UK’s AI capability development remain to be seen.

Despite shifts in rhetoric, the UK’s current AI development and international influence remain significantly shaped by the safety legacy established by the previous Conservative Prime Minister, Rishi Sunak. The Sunak government positioned the UK as a global safety leader by hosting the first AI Safety Summit in Bletchley Park in 2023, and launching the first AI Safety Institute to evaluate frontier models. This represents an aspiration to balance pro-innovation regulation alongside extreme risk mitigation, creating the strategic foundation upon which the current national framework is built.

What the UK Offers

The UK’s strategy begins with its proactive diplomatic initiatives, which leverage a middle-ground regulatory posture to brand itself as the world’s convener on AI safety and security. In 2023, it hosted the first AI Safety Summit and brokered the multi‑stakeholder “Bletchley” commitments. Britain also built early credibility as a leader in AI governance by pioneering the AI Safety Institute (AISI) (renamed to AI Security Institute) at the summit, which offers an institutional platform for evaluating advanced AI models. Through the AISI’s collaborations with major frontier AI firms, including OpenAI, Google DeepMind, and Anthropic, the UK government aspires to maintain a central, practical role in developing and setting global AI security standards, especially around pre-deployment testing and evaluation. The AISI model has proven influential, spurring the creation of similar national bodies in the US, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and China and the establishment of the International Network of AI Safety Institutes to drive global technical alignment. The AISI has also undertaken notable work on online safety, specifically tackling child sexual abuse.

Another strength core to the UK’s soft power strategy lies in its development of AI assurance and auditing frameworks. This focus leverages the UK’s deep-rooted historical strength in professional services, financial auditing, and corporate governance, providing a trusted foundation for validating AI systems. Although often overlooked in discussions focused solely on frontier risk, the UK government has prioritized trusted third-party AI assurance for over five years, positioning itself as a global leader in AI assurance services to distribute related knowledge internationally. This approach culminated in the recent Trusted Third-Party AI Assurance Roadmap (2025).

Domestically, Britain’s research pipeline offers structural advantages. Universities including Oxford and Cambridge continue to produce world‑class AI scientists and attract investment for AI research and innovation. London remains a magnet for top international talent, as well as the preferred European base for many global technology companies. These researchers feed a steady stream of spinouts that tap the City of London’s deep pools of venture and growth capital, underpinned by a sophisticated legal framework that makes contracts and intellectual property protection relatively stable.

Share

What the UK Wants from the World

The UK emphasizes the need for energy and compute resources to realize its AI sovereignty and leadership ambitions, making the scaling of national infrastructure a priority for the current government. Downing Street aims to scale up the nation’s compute power “by a factor of 20” by building up power, permits, and a diversified AI hardware supply. Successfully achieving this scale is viewed as key to reaping the potential economic rewards of AI. However, whether investment in compute will materialize into actual AI sovereignty and economic benefit remains an open debate.

While the UK boasts a strong research pipeline that has successfully incubated high-value firms, these companies have often been bought by foreign entities before achieving domestic scale, including DeepMind (acquired by Google), Darktrace (acquired by Thoma Bravo), and semiconductor intellectual property (IP) giant Arm (acquired by SoftBank). This pattern results in the export of UK-generated research and IP. The UK retains its research base, while ceding control and profits from the downstream products. Leaders in the UK AI startup scene view the lack of government-backed funding and the high cost of talent as the main barriers to company retention. To address these concerns, the SAIU is tasked with using public procurement, access to datasets, and equity stakes to help domestic firms clear funding hurdles. The government has also recently launched various initiatives to attempt to attract and sustain global AI talent. Concurrently, the government has sharpened its defensive regulatory strategy, utilizing the National Security and Investment Act (NSIA) to block foreign takeovers of sensitive technology, such as the forced divestment of the Chinese-owned Nexperia from Newport Wafer Fab. However, this regulatory effort focuses heavily on security concerns rather than broad market incubation.

Although well-positioned as a global convener on AI safety and security, the UK’s soft power ultimately relies on international momentum to drive substantive progress. Currently, the international AISI network is still in its initial phases, with uncertainty in terms of actionable outputs and domestic support from member countries. Although an early leader in changing the named focus from safety to security, the securitization of AI safety may yet challenge UK-supported international cooperation efforts and the UK’s respective soft power in the AI governance arena.

Subscribe now

US-China Alignment

The United Kingdom pursues an asymmetric approach to the US-China AI competition, maintaining deep strategic and commercial alignment with the US while preserving selective channels for dialogue with China. This positioning reflects both the UK’s historical “special relationship” with Washington and its pragmatic recognition that meaningful AI development requires access to American technology, capital, and security partnerships. Senior British officials have acknowledged this reality, with one recently stating “Only America has the capability, wealth and determination to compete with China technologically” reflecting the government’s assessment that the UK’s AI ambitions depend fundamentally on US partnership.

The September 2025 Technology Prosperity Deal elevated AI to a central pillar of the UK-US relationship, formalizing cooperation across research, commerce, and security domains. This partnership manifests concretely in both government and private sector collaboration: American firms have committed hundreds of billions in investments to UK AI infrastructure, including Palantir’s £480 million NHS contract, extensive Microsoft and OpenAI strategic partnerships, and pervasive involvement throughout the UK’s AI stack from data centers to cloud services. The UK’s AISI works closely with US counterparts and major American AI companies including OpenAI, Google DeepMind, and Anthropic on model testing and safety research.

The UK’s AI engagement with China is more limited than with the US, reflecting broader geopolitical tensions and national security considerations. Notably absent are the deep commercial partnerships, technology transfers, and infrastructure investments that characterize UK-US AI cooperation, with the NSIA acting as a potential major barrier. Compared to the US, the UK takes a more open position towards China, including inviting China to the Bletchley Summit and stressing the importance of Chinese participation in the AI safety and security conversation. The China-UK Artificial Intelligence Dialogue, launched in May 2025, represents the primary formal channel for bilateral AI engagement, with its inaugural meeting focusing on AI governance and safety cooperation. Anchored in the US and European AI ecosystems, the UK continues to carefully engage with China on select topics and platforms, leveraging its convening power when it might add economic or global security value.

Leave a comment

Note: This living set of country profiles is intended to be an accessible resource for policymakers, academics, and industry professionals, and all others seeking to understand the international relations of the technology transforming our virtual feeds and physical environments. It reflects the state of affairs at the time of writing (December 2025).

Authors: Sydney Reis*, Zilan Qian*, Karuna Nandkumar*, Kayla Blomquist⁺, Sam Hogg, Sumaya Nur Adan, Julia Pamilih, Jonas Balkus, Renan Araujo, Songruowen Ma, Tiffany Chan1

Singapore’s AI Strategy

Singapore’s National AI Strategy 2.0, published in 2023, currently guides domestic AI development. The strategy focuses on downstream deployment and industrial applications, supported by relatively light-touch regulations to encourage innovation. It makes clear that Singapore seeks to build global partnerships to attract three key inputs for AI development: a vibrant AI research and business ecosystem; talent; and high-performance computing capabilities.

So far, the Singaporean government has not expressed specific interest in building a frontier model or a large-scale foundation model comparable to those of leading frontier developers in the US or China. Despite recent reports of Singapore’s development and leadership in “sovereign AI”, its approach to a third way beyond the US and China is different from that of many countries. Rather than focusing on full-stack AI independence, Singapore’s vision emphasizes providing multifaceted AI capabilities that address gaps left by US and Chinese offerings.

What Singapore Offers

The Singaporean government is developing AI models and evaluation frameworks that emphasize multilingualism and multiculturalism. Since the top-performing AI models are predominantly developed in the US and China, English and Chinese are linguistically overrepresented. This lack of AI model language diversity creates socio-technical challenges for states where these languages are not primary. For instance, Singapore built and updated SEA-LION and MERaLiON to cater to Southeast Asia’s linguistic and cultural nuances. It also collaborates with Japan and the UK to lead the International Network of AI Safety Institutes’ multilingual LLM evaluation projects, which aim to improve AI model evaluation methods for languages other than English. Singapore’s approach, which embeds local languages and cultures into its AI models, is particularly valuable for Southeast Asia and offers lessons for countries around the world to tailor capability development to their local environments.

Subscribe now

Singapore serves as a base for global AI companies, offering a stable business ecosystem and strategic location for accessing the high-demand Southeast Asian and broader Asian markets. Key factors include its strong talent pool, multilingual workforce, and advanced infrastructure and technology integration, all consistently supported by the government’s reliable pro-business policies. Consequently, Singapore hosts major regional and global AI firms from various developed economies: US companies like Google’s Alphabet, Meta, and OpenAI, leading Chinese tech firms such as Alibaba, Tencent, and ByteDance, and European players like Mistral AI have established a presence. These companies leverage Singapore’s policy and business advantages, while contributing to efforts from regional-specific models development to advising on Singapore’s AI governance frameworks.

Singapore has also attempted to empower small states in AI governance. It launched the Digital Forum of Small States initiative in 2022 and co-developed the AI Playbook for Small States with Rwanda in 2024. Regionally, under Singapore’s chairmanship of the ASEAN Digital Ministers’ Meeting in 2024, all ten ASEAN member states adopted the ASEAN Guide on AI Governance and Ethics—an initiative strongly shaped by Singapore’s Model AI Governance Framework. These initiatives facilitated knowledge-sharing and international engagement, helping small states address AI adoption challenges, such as limited data, talent, and influence in global discourse.

What Singapore Wants from the World

Singapore seeks a significant increase in compute resources to meet its growing AI needs. As a small nation with energy disadvantages, the government has repeatedly expressed the need to balance energy demands and environmental implications. Singapore is positioning itself as an ideal location for the semiconductor industry to expand with infrastructure, talent, and investment support. Recent collaborations include Japan’s UMC and US’s Micron. Meanwhile, it aims to build its already-dense data center capacity (nearly 100 data centers) by at least one-third, while mandating at least 40% needs to be from operators who use green energy options. The nation may also collaborate with the US, China, and other providers in its existing data center landscape.

Share

In the near term, Singapore will have to navigate this tension between building a domestic AI industry and attracting foreign businesses.. The influx of foreign AI companies has sharpened competitive pressures on Singapore’s tech ecosystem, prompting the government to introduce targeted support measures. For example, the government is boosting AI adoption in local enterprises, supporting 2,000 digitally mature local firms across sectors through workshops, design assistance, and funding for in-house digital teams which operationalize and scale AI initiatives. Singapore also attracts international expertise through initiatives such as the Global Founder Programme and partnerships with more than 100 global corporations to establish AI Centers of Excellence. To improve local access to compute, the government announced the S$150 million ($115 million) Enterprise Compute Initiative (ECI) in February 2025 to help small-and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) access AI tools from major cloud providers. Under this initiative, AWS partners with the government to help 300+ local companies access its cloud services. To sustain its business ecosystem advantages, Singapore is attempting to support its local AI industry without creating excessive competitive disadvantages for the multinational companies that provide scale and immediate expertise.

US-China Alignment

Singapore’s AI approach is deeply connected to its long-standing foreign policy, which analysts often characterize as a “hedging strategy,” intended to maintain strategic autonomy and mitigate the dangers posed by competition between great powers. This historical commitment to maintaining balance between major powers is now central to its AI policy, with Singapore positioning itself as an intermediary between the US and China. The government has officially established bilateral dialogues with the US and China on AI development, digital cooperation, and data sharing. Singapore has engaged with the US on AI risks, initiating a crosswalk between NIST’s “AI Risk Management Framework” and Singapore’s IMDA AI Verify Testing Framework to support organisations in aligning their AI work with US and Singaporean recommendations. At the same time, Singapore will use China’s open-source model Qwen as a foundation for the new update of its national model SEA-LION.

Subscribe now

Singapore is also recognized as a convenor for unofficial AI governance and safety exchanges that bridge the US-China divide. The state’s long-standing policy of neutrality between great powers, combined with strong economic and diplomatic ties to both countries, creates an accessible and politically viable venue for multilateral engagement. This neutrality proves particularly valuable for facilitating dialogue among scholars, private sector actors, and international organizations from both sides who might otherwise struggle to engage directly. The government has leveraged this convening power to advance international AI safety cooperation, exemplified by the “Singapore Consensus on Global AI Safety Research Priorities“ announced in May 2025, a framework assessed as helpful to mitigating catastrophic AI risks. In academia, Singapore is also expanding collaborative AI research through joint grant calls and PhD programs, like recent initiatives with South Korea and New Zealand focused on deepfakes and healthcare.

Singapore’s strategy of balancing its relationship between the US and China is not without risks and complexities. While Singapore and China maintain strong economic and trade ties, Singapore’s security-related cooperation, particularly concerning AI, leans more heavily towards the US. As US-China tensions escalate, this hedging strategy is challenged, leading to disputes, notably concerning the AI chip supply chain and trade. Within increasingly bifurcated ecosystems, Singapore attempts to leverage its position to become a high-trust technological bridge and balanced rule-setter. This creates space for Singapore to pursue its own objectives, strengthening its regional influence and long-term economic resilience amid geopolitical uncertainties.

Leave a comment

Note: This living set of country profiles is intended to be an accessible resource for policymakers, academics, and industry professionals, and all others seeking to understand the international relations of the technology transforming our virtual feeds and physical environments. It reflects the state of affairs at the time of writing (December 2025).

Authors: Sydney Reis*, Zilan Qian*, Karuna Nandkumar*, Kayla Blomquist⁺, Sam Hogg, Sumaya Nur Adan, Julia Pamilih, Jonas Balkus, Renan Araujo, Songruowen Ma, Tiffany Chan1

Authors: Sydney Reis*, Zilan Qian*, Karuna Nandkumar*, Kayla Blomquist+, Sam Hogg, Sumaya Nur Adan, Jonas Balkus, Renan Araujo, Songruowen Ma, Tiffany Chan1

Note: This living set of country profiles is intended to be an accessible resource for policymakers, academics, and industry professionals, and all others seeking to understand the international relations of the technology transforming our virtual feeds and physical environments. It reflects the state of affairs at the time of writing (December 2025).

Introduction

With US and Chinese AI ecosystems producing the world’s top performing AI models and receiving the highest amounts of global investment, AI has become the new arena of great power competition. Everything from AI funding, to compute power, and even AI companionship, is now framed as a competition between the US and China. Moreover, reaching Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) – defined by experts as AI with human-level cognitive ability across a wide breadth and depth of skills – has been discussed as a US-China race in policy, military, and commercial circles since 2020. But beyond the US-China binary, numerous aspiring AI powers play diverse and important roles in AI development and governance. This series explores how aspiring AI powers are diversifying the global AI ecosystem, and in the process, challenging the assumption that AI development and diffusion is a simple race between the US and China.

In America’s AI Action Plan, the US has expressed explicit ambitions for global adoption of its AI systems, computing hardware, and standards. Meanwhile, China has implied similar goals by promoting its AI models as affordable alternatives, exporting digital infrastructure through the Digital Silk Road and aligned initiatives, and establishing interoperable AI standards, as outlined in its Global AI Governance Action Plan. Today, the US and China are widely recognized as the key shapers of this century’s technological revolution, and the accompanying opportunities, risks, and rules of the road. Despite prolific emphasis on AI as a race between the US and China, the presence of other aspiring AI powers complicates a simple picture of US and Chinese AI dominance. In many cases, these states are establishing their own spheres of AI influence, building foundational models, promoting their own AI norms and standards, and leveraging the power that comes with their comparative advantages within the AI development chain. The strategies and relative strengths and weaknesses of these aspiring AI powers tell a more complex, and arguably complete, story of AI’s impact on geopolitics, now and in the years to come.

Share

This series provides a high-level analysis of a set of consequential aspiring AI powers from 2020-2025: Brazil, France, India, Indonesia, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, the UAE, and the UK.2 It explores each state’s AI strategy; contributions, or what states offer to the global AI ecosystem; and interests, or what the state needs from its own or the global AI ecosystem to achieve its strategic goals. These states have rapidly growing AI ecosystems; ambitious plans for AI development; and, to varying extents, demonstrable influence on emerging AI governance structures and norms. From either a hard capabilities or soft power standpoint, these states are seeking to develop their own leverage in the context of US-China AI competition and power concentration.

Structure

Each country profile contains four subsections on the respective state’s (i) overarching AI strategy; (ii) relative contributions to AI development, diffusion, and governance; (iii) relative interests or “asks” in order to achieve development, diffusion, and governance goals; and (iv) alignment with the US and Chinese AI ecosystems.

For the purposes of this document, a given state’s overarching AI strategy refers to the AI strategy that was enacted at the state’s highest level of government and is currently active. For most states, this is simply referred to as the national AI strategy. However, state actions can deviate from the formal rhetoric found in national strategies, which may serve as aspirational signaling rather than reflecting practical policy plans and implementation. In the future, it will become more clear whether the actions of these aspiring AI powers will align with their national AI strategies.

In addition to official rhetoric, this report documents each state’s current relative contributions and relative interests – in relation to each other and to the US and China – in various aspects of AI development, diffusion, and governance. AI development requires access to tangible resources such as talent, compute, natural resources, energy, and investment. It also requires immaterial resources such as soft power to influence international AI governance and the strength of domestic innovation ecosystems to attract talent, investment, and corporate development.

After presenting these three variables, each country profile details its connectivity to the US and Chinese AI ecosystems. Previously disruptive technologies have seen states rally around different ‘poles.’ During the Cold War, for instance, states rallied around the US or USSR, the two poles in the nuclear arms race. In the 1990s and early 2000s, few states had their own internet infrastructure, adopting instead the ‘open’ US-based model, the ‘closed’ Chinese model, or, at a time, the highly regulated EU model. Today, state approaches to AI are fundamentally different. Keen to avoid the dependencies of technologies past, many states are vying for AI sovereignty, defined by the UK government as “the ability to access, influence or control the development and deployment of critical capabilities to protect national interests and unlock economic growth”. While there is little consensus on the definition and viability of AI sovereignty, many states collaborate with the US, China, or both to rapidly develop and deploy AI for domestic economic benefits.

Mapping the Geopolitics of AI

Taken together, this comprehensive analysis of state strategies, contributions, interests, and US-China alignment sheds light on a new field: the geopolitics of AI. The web of states’ intentions, interests, and alliances can lay the groundwork for researchers to investigate fundamental questions at the intersection of AI, international relations, and policy today: Why do states make certain decisions regarding AI development and governance? How can interested stakeholders predict key shifts in national and international AI landscapes? While this series does not claim to provide definitive answers to these questions, it provides a starting point for further research. By anchoring aspiring AI powers firmly in the study of international relations – as independent actors with agency and varying levels of influence in the international system – researchers, academics, and policymakers can add needed complexity to the repeated adage that the geopolitics of AI is confined to a “race” between the US and the China.